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IN

RE KI"LVlLER

Tlw ot'dt>r,.; n t·e affirmP!l withont prejudiee to appellant
right to ,.,,,,.];: restit11tion aftr·r th0 disposition of thr propt•rty is :-;ptt]<.(L
Oibson, C. ,J., Shenk, ,J., Edmonds, .J., Carter, ,J., Sehauer,
.T., and Spenct>, .J., conenned.
Appellant\; jWtition for a l'f'heal'ing was denietl Attgust
1!JG1.

[Crim. Xo. 5046.

ln Bank.

n,

July 13, 19fil.]

In re CIIARI"..ES \:VAI.1KEH KIMLER, on Habeas Corpus.
[1a, 1b] Extradition-Habeas Corpus-Judgment-Finality of Determination.-ln habeas corpus proceedings, petitioner cannot
successfully assert that the judgment of a court of a sister state
in habeas corpus proceedings, discharging him from detention
under an extradition warrant of this state, is a final determination that the action of local authorities in paroling him to the
prison authorities of a third state operated as a pardon barring
his further imprisonmPnt in this state, where the judgment
relied on does not purport to be such a final determination, but,
by its clear language, determines only that "the facts and
circumstances are not sufficient to justify" extradition, and
that "no sufficient cause for the detention" of the petitioner
was shown.
[2] !d.-Habeas Corpus-Jurisdiction.-A court of a sister state
is without jurisdiction, in a habeas corpus proceeding in connection with extradition, to adjudicate the question of the
effect on petitioner's liability for further imprisonment in this
state of the action of local authorities in releasing him on
parole to the prison authorities of a third state.
[3] !d.-Habeas Corpus-Scope of Inquiry.-The scope of inquiry
in a summary proceeding in habeas corpus to prevent extradition is normally limited to a determination of whether the
statutory prerequisites have been complied with in the requisition and rendition, the court being without authority to inquire
into the merits of the charge against the person whose extradition is sought.
[4] Judgments-Sister State Judgments.-A court should not place
on the judgment of a court of a sister state a construction
[ 4] See 1fi Cal.Jur. 240; 31 Am.Jur. 138.
McK. Dig. References: [1-3, 5] Extradition,§ 14; [4] Judgments,
§ 472; [6] Extradition,§ 5; [7] Prisons and Prisoners,§ 15.
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which is out of harmony with the decisions of the highest court
of the state in which it is rendered.
[5] Extradition-Habeas Corpus-Judgment-Res Judicata.-A
discharge of petitioner in habeas corpus proceedings in B
sister state in connection with his extradition therefrom is not
res judicata in habeas corpus proceedings in this state attack~
ing the rig·ht of this state to continue his imprisonment after
having released him on parole.
[6] Id.- Persons Extraditable- Persons Paroled.
It i~ elr•arly
established that petitioner went to priwn in a sister statr•
voluntarily under a conditional parolP and that this state's
jurisdiction over him continued, where the evidence fully supports a referee's finding that petitioner, in connection with his
parole application, requested a personal interview relative to a
detainer placed against him by the sister state, in which interview he requested that arrangements be made to return him to
prison in the sister state, and that when he was turned over
to an agent of that state he sigm•d a "Ticket of Leave" and
letter setting forth the conditions of his parol<:>.
[7] Prisons and Prisoners-Parole.-Once having <:>lected to accept
a conditional parole, the parolee is bound by the express terms
thereof.

PROCEEDING m habeas corpus to secure relem;e from
custody. Writ denied.
Ernrst Spagnoli, at rcqHPst of Petitioner appointed by
Supreme Court, for Petitioner.
Fred N. Howser and Edmund G. Brown, Attorneys General,
B. Abbott Goldberg and Clarence A. Linn, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Respondent.
EDMONDS, ,J.-B:· his petition for a writ of habeas
eorpus, Charles W alkPr Kimler is attacking the right of this
statr to contimw his imprisonment after he was releasrd upon
parole. Hr asserts that, in effect, the parole granted to
him was a pardon. He also relies upon a judgment in Missouri by which be was released from custody following his
arrest upon a warrant of extradition.
After having been convicted in this state and sentenced
to life imprisonment under each of three separate judgments,
the sentence8 to run coneurrently, he was released upon
[6] Extradition of paroled convict, note, 78 A.L.R. 419.
also, 12 Cal.Jur. 397; 22 Am.Jur. 264.

See,

in the Missouri nroe1?ec1m.f!
determination that the action
the California
him to Illinois was a
which
in this state. There are two
to this contention,. [1] First, the Missouri court
""""·""'+ to determine the effect of Kimler's release
authorities of this state. [2] In the second
could not have been adjudicated; be~
limited scope of inquiry in a habeas corpus
connection with extradition, there was no
so.
Kimler contended that "when the State of
to
him into the
of the
this act upon their part operated as a
for the crime he was sentenced for in
California~
'' }I(r\vever, the court did not llndertake to
decide that
Preliminarily, it pointed out '' . . .
that this is not a new requisition on a new
but a
on this old matter. .
" It then found that
and
are not
to
'' . . . the
tl1e
extradition of the
to the
State
'' The
declared that
the detention of said um;n1om'r
"
. that the Writ of Habeas Coru>a.ucuc, and that the
and detention
Til>1'11'1fYYH>.,.

the clear language of the Missouri
fact determined was that the ''facts and circumnot sufficient to
and '

trial in another
are not allowed to
powers are limited to a determination
of the paprrs and the
of the
22 Fla. 36, 45 [1
)
The United Statrs Supremr Court has described the nature
of habeas corpus proceedings incident to extradition m the
following languagr: "It is but one
in
the
presence of the drfendant in the court in which
be
and in no manner determines the
. . . thr
assimilate very
those commenced
in any State for tlw a.ITCRt and detention
an
criminal. They go npon the
that extradition
but
a mere
111
tlw prrsence of the defendant in the
court in which be may. lawfully be tried."
197 U.S.
333
S.Ct.
49 I_J.Ed.
The contention made
Kimler before the Missouri court
that he was not a
because he had been
similar to the onr consiclerrd in Drew v.
440
S.Ct.
59 L.Ed.
Holmes said: "But this is not Thaw's ' trial.
clition
. . . , the purpose of the writ
snbstitutP the judgnwnt of another tribunal upon the facts
or the law of the mattrr to be tried. . . . And
if it be
true that the
stated offers a nice
it is a
as to the law of New York which the New York
courts must decide."
So in the present case, the merits of Kimler defense
were not for the Missouri court to determine. 'fhe ques-
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lion ac; to wlwtlwr 1\imlPr YiolatPd his parol!' by going
to Missouri after lw was rPkasNl from prison in Illinois is
one fot· drtPrmination by the courts of California. "If the
eourt on hnhcas corpus inquires into the merits of the charge
against the prisoner or into the motives which inspired the
prosecution in the demanding State, it exceeds its authority
under the constitutional and statutory provisions regulating
thP extradition of criminals. The mandate of the constitution requires 'a person charged in any State with a crime'
to be delivered by the asylum State to the State whose laws
he has violated. That State alone can determine the guilt
or itmoeE'nce of the offending party. The theory and the
intention of the constitutional and statutory provisions are
that the offender shall be compelled to submit himself for
trial to the courts of the State in which the offense was
committed, and hence it would be usurpation of authority
for the courts of another State to undertake to determine
the question of his guilt in a habeas corpus proceeding.''
(Commonwealth v. Superintendent County Prison, 220 Pa. 401
j6H A. 916, 21 hR.A.N.S. 939]. as quoted in In re Ray, 21fi
Mich. 156, 165 [188 N.W. 774].)
[4] 1\/Ioreovt>r, this court should not plaec: upon the ,judgmt•nt a construction which is out of harmony with the decisions of the highest court of the state in which it was
rendered. fn State v. II offmeisfer, 386 Mo. 682 [ 80 S.W.2d
195], the Supreme Court of Missouri had before it an applieation for a writ of certiorari to quash a judgment in a
habeas corpus proceeding which discharged a paroled eonviet from the agent's custody. Rosenberg, an inmate of an
111inoi,; penit(•ntiary, had been given permission to reside
temporarily and eonditionally in Missouri. Upon information
that ht< was under arrest upon a charge of having violated
the law of Missouri, the warden of the Illinois institution
orderPd him returned to custody in the penitentiary pending
a clecision by the department of public welfare of Illinois
npon the question of whether he had violated his parole.
\Vhen arrested in Missouri upon an extradition warrant,
Rosenberg attempted to secure his release in a habeas corpus
proceeding. ''At the trial it was admitted that the requisition
conformed to the Federal statutes and presented a prima
facie case. However, it was contended that Rosenberg had
not violated his parole, and for that reason was not a fugitive from justice. The circuit court so found and discharged
him. This was the only question presented. Illinois con-
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t!~nds

that the courts of an asylum state are without jurisdiction on habeas corpus to determine the question of the
guilt or innocence of the person in the custody of the agent
of the drmanding state. The contention must be sustained.
It has beer1 so ruled by all the authorities. [18 U.S.C.A.,
~ 662, notr 61. pp. 82!1, :)30, :~:31 ]
It follows that the pro('f'{'C1illgs and record of the Circuit Court of the Cit~· of St.
!Jouis in th'• lwbeas cm·pus case should be quashed." (State v.
/loffmeisfer, supra, at p. 684; quoted with approval in R:x
pm·tc Poste1·, 60 Okla. Cr. i'iO [61 P.2d :37.:39, 40].)
[5] Jn the Hoffmeister case, as here, the petitioner eont<>nded that hr was not a parole violator. Rosenberg admittrd
his Htatus as a parolee but argued that he had done nothing
eontrary to the terms of his parole. Kimler says he is not
a parole violator, although substantially charged as such,
becanse his parole became a pardon when the California
authoritirs permittNl him to be taken into custody by Illinoi~. The Snpreme Court of Missouri held that Rosenberg's
l:ights were governed by the rnle that the asylum state may
not inq11ire into the guilt or innocence of the accused; the
qnestion presented >vas for the determination of the ckmanding state. 'l'his is equally true as to Kimler, and his
(1ischarge in habeas corpus in Missouri is not res judicata
in the prrsent proceeding.
Kimler also eontends that Califomia rdinquishe<1 all jurisdiction to pnforee completion of hiH unexpired t<>rm of
imprisonment by relrasing him to the State of Illinois. He
states that he did not vohmtarily accept the parole to further
imprisonmt>nt in Illinois, and argues that statements appearing in his "Ticket of Leave," which are contrary to his
present position, were "rvidently added after petitioner's
signature was placed thereon.''
Pnr~nant to an order of this conrt, a referee was appointrd
to hrar alHl take trstimony dirrcted and rrsponsiw to the
follo,ving questions:
(1) Did Kimler sign ll '"l'irkrt of LeaY('" whieh thnn
stated: ''You arr being paroled into the custody of the fllinois State Authorities to be by them confined. Tn the rwnt
you are released from their custody prior to the expiration
of your term of California imprisonment, you will contact
the California State Parole Officer and abide by the instructions he will give you.''
(2) Did Kimler sign thr "Ticket of Leave" in the pres-
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and did 0.

Kim~

C. Moreas witness thereto at that time
Board of Prison Terms and Paroles order
Kimler from the California State Prison at
on
to the custody of officers of the State of
Illinois for the purpose of
him to further
onmcnt in
state
, upon these
the referee
each question in the affirmative.
them made by Kimler concerns the
determination that he was released in this state for the
purpose of further
in Illinois.
Kimler's
may be summarized
from his counsel's brief : ''The
before
Heferee sho>YS that Kimler was granted a parole
and that Jw \Yas extradited. Evidently the extradition would
not have been made efl'Pctive unless
a 'pa' was not one that was
role.' And. the '
as his
shows. Kimler had
or wanted
no desire to return to Joliet and complete there a term of
that he contended and still contends he wa,;
to complete. Ther·e is no
bttl
what Kimler was extmclitecl. The evidence and
dueed before this Court's Referee shows that
Parole
false
inasmueh as Kimler was
tied up
and delivered over to Illinois agents who were
with
papers, but with extradition papers, towit a warrant
the Governor surrendered Kimler
to Illinois.''
one Marzec
released
upon the
''never in fact became effective.''
Marzec also claimed that he "never was released on
Folsom Prison
the

Ill

CVJUHO\CCJlVU

wrote a letter to
State Board of Prison Directors
the Board of Prison 'ferms and
interview "relative to a detainer
him. ..c'\t the interview, Kimler
that
be made for his release from the Polsom
to the Illinois prison. On November
an
Illinois took delivery of Kimler who
the '' 'l'icket of
forth the conditions
Leave'' and his letter of that date
of his
[7] Considering these facts, it is clear that Kimler went
to the Illinois prison voluntarily under a conditional
and this state's jurisdiction over him continued.
su.pra.) He might have
the offer of
but once
elected to accept
express terms of the conditional release.
re
Cal.2d
674 [128 P.2d338].)
The exceptions to the findings of the referee are
and his determinations are adopted as the
court.
The oruer to show cause is ""'""a'"
for the '>vrit of habeas corpus is denied.
C.
concurred.
J.~~-1 dissent.
In this case the
situation
1936
was eonvicted in this state on several counts of
extortion and kidnapping for the purpose
sentenced to three life terms to run
served
in a prison in this state until November, 1943. Vlhen he was
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eonvicted
he was under parole commeneing December,
]!)28. from lllinoic;. havi11g lH•en eonvicted of forgery in that
statP. 'l'hc Illinois authorities hatl revoked his Illinois parole
and filed a dl'tain<•r reqnec;t with the California prison authorities, inasmueh as his Illinois term had not been completely
served. In March. 1943. the California authorities decided
to parole petitioner, and in November did so, to the eustody
of Illinois. where he would continue to serve the Illinois
term. The condition of the parole was that upon release by
Illinois, petitioner would contact the California parole officer
and abide by his instructions. The state does not deny that
no detainer of petitioner was filed with the Illinois prison
authorities. Petitioner ·was released by Illinois in 1947, and
upon his refusal to submit himself to California parole offieers, his parole was revoked. He went to Missouri where,
after being taken into custody pursuant to extradition proceedings instituted by California, he was ordered released
from custody by a Missouri court in habeas corpus proceedings. ('I' hose proceedings are later discussed herein.) He
went to Oregon, then to Washington, from which state he
was finally extradited to California, where he is now held
to complete his term since he violated his parole.
'rhe majority opinion asserts that the judgment in habeas
eOl'pus proceedings releasing Kimler in Missouri is not res
judicata because the same issues are not involved and the
Missouri court did not have jurisdiction to deeide the issues.
Neither of those propositions is correct.
In connection with the Missouri habeas corpus proceedings, it is clear that the same issues were involved as are now
presented, that is, the waiver by California of further jurisdiction over petitioner rather than, as claimed by the state,
the sufficieney of the warrant in the Missouri extradition
proceedings.
In the Missouri ease, petitioner alleged in his application
that he was being held on a warrant for violation of his
California parole; that the Governor had issued a warrant
for his arrest pursuant to extradition proceedings on the
basis that petitioner was a fugitive from justice; that he was
not a fugitive from justice for he was convicted and imprisoned in California, then he was granted what was ''termed''
a parole into the custody of the Illinois authorities and taken
by them to Illinois; that no ''hold order'' was placed by
California with the Illinois authorities; that when California
''attempted to parole him into the custody of the Illinois

there and serve in the
life \YOUld
him for his offense.'' No contention ·was
made that the request or warrant in the extradition prowas insufficient.
The return to the application for the writ rested on the
extradition papers and that Kimler was a
from
The stipulated facts joined in by the extradition
for California set forth the events heretofore
including the parole papers. They show that Kimler was
the
convicted and imprisoned in California; that he
parole ticket of leave to Illinois; that thereafter he ''was
taken by officers and agents of ... Illinois who handcuffed
him and took him from the California State Prison at Folsom, ·with the consent and
of tl1e
authorities of California and returned him to ... Illinois where he
vvas again incarcerated in the Illinois State
at
,Joliet until about the 9th day of July, 1947, when he had
eompleted his sentence and was then diseharged
the State
of Illinois'' ; that he refused to submit to the parole officers
in Missouri or accept a California parole.
At the hearing it was shown that Kimler had
convicted of the crime in California, rather than
charged with it; that a detainer notice had been filed by
Illinois with the California prison authorities and no
could be granted "'When such was the
The
tioned the California agent in
only charg·ed or had alrrady been
has alrrad;.. been tried and thrre
on
Warrant
it would appear there was a new
him.
T suppose there is not any question but that this is not a new
requisition on a new complaint, but a requisition on this old
matter? MR. BRENNAN (California agent) : That is right.
37 C.2d-19
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::\lR. ll OTJGH: That is agreed, your Honor. There is nothing
prnding· against him in the Rtate of California, except that
which has already b('<'ll adjudieated. THE CouRT: The Court
orders the discharge of thP petitioner from custody." The
plain inference is that the judge wanted to make clear that
there was not a charge against Kimler other than the one
of which he was convicted, thus indicating that he felt
Kimler's claim that California had waived any further claim
ovee him under the conviction was well taken, and, as there
was no new charge, the prisoner should be discharged for
he was not a fugitive from justice. This is further evinced by
the judge's judgment of discharge where he stated: "The
Court finds that the facts and circumstances are not sufficient to justify the surrender and extradition of the petitioner
to the State of California and no sufficient cause for the
detention of the said petitioner appearing, it is ordered by
the Court that the Writ of Habeas Corpus be sustained and
made permanent, and that the petitioner, Charles Walker
Kimler, be, by Arthur Mosely, Sheriff of St. Louis County
and Joseph B. Brennan, Agent of the State of California,
discharged from imprisonment and detention for the cause
aforesaid.'' (Italics added.) The ''facts and circumstances''
referred to in the judgment indicate the delivery of Kimler
to Illinois without any detainer other than some defect in
the extradition warrant, and the judgment is presumed to
be responsive to the claim made in the application. We
may presume that the judgment was based upon the claims
made in the pleadings rather than an unmentioned ground.
(See Woolverton v. Baker, 98 CaL 628 [33 P. 731].) Moreover, in considering the queries by the judge concerning
whether the extradition was based on an old or new charge,
it has long been the practice to treat a parole violator as
a prrson charged with a crime in extradition proceedings.
(See In 1·e McBride, 101 Cal.App. 251 [281 P. 651]; case:-;
cited 78 A.I_l.R. 424; 22 Am.Jur., Extradition, § 25.)
'J'hus, I have presented and decided in favor of Kimler
in the Missouri proceedings the question of whether the deli very of Kimler to the Illinois authorities by California
under the circumstances established that California had relinquished any further claim over Kimler even though he
signed the ticket of leave. (See similar question considered :
In re Marzec, 25 Cal.2d 794 [154 P.2d 873] ; In re Whittington, 34 Cal.App. 344 [167 P. 4041 ; and People v. Bartley,
383 Ill. 437 [50 N.E.2d 517].)
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The agent designated by California to receive Kimler in
the Missouri extradition proceedings was active and participated in the habeas corpus matter. Although he did not
have aetual custody of Kimler (he was being held by a
Missouri sheriff), he was named a respondent therein. He
joined in the stipulation of facts and testified at the hearing. Under these circumstances, California was adequately
rf'presentecl in the habeas corpus cause.
'I'hr discharge of Kimler in Missouri must be treated as
res judicata on the issue above mentioned, that is, that there
is no longer any basis for California to imprison Kimler
arising from his conviction here, and therefore he is entitled
to a discharge in this proceeding. The general policy of
treating a discharge in habeas corpus as final has been established. ''No person who has been discharged by the order
of the court or judge upon habeas corpus can be again imprisoned, restrained, or kept in custody for the same cause,
Pxeept in tl1c following cases: 1. If he has been discharged
from custody on a criminal charge, and is afterwards committed for the same offense, by legal order or process ; 2. If,
after a discharge for defect of proof, or for any defect of
the process, warrant, or commitment in a criminal case, the
prisoner is again arrested on sufficient proof and committed
by legal process for the same offense." (Pen. Code, § 1496.)
In the instant case it is clear that the Missouri proceeding
dors not fall within either of the two exceptions. It was
not a case where the accused was discharged from custody
for some defect in tl1c process or trial proceedings. Further
it is statPd: "Every person who either solely or as a member
of a court knowingly and unlawfully recommits, imprisons,
or restrains of his librrty, for the same cause, any person
who has been discharged upon a writ of habeas corpus, is
g-uilty of a misdemeanor." (Pen. Codr, § 363.) This court
has said on the subject: ''A judgment of discharg-e upon
habeas (:orpus may or may not be res adjudicata, but this
will drprnd wholly upon the questions necessarily clPterminNl
in the deeision upon the writ. The rights of prisoners under
the writ of habeas corpus were first crystallized in the English Habeas Corpus Act of 31 Car. II. By seetion 6 of that
act, for the prevention of unjust vexation by reiterated commitments for the same offem;e, it was enacted 'that no person
or persons which shall be delivered or set at large upon any
habeas corpus, shall at any time hereafter be again imprisoned or committed for the same offense by any person or

C.2d

coolie was
upon habeas corpus,
upon the
had been committed a second time for the same ofto the sixth section of 31 Car. IT, the
Lord Justice Mellish, said
vdth the construction which the chief
section of the statute: 'The principal
""'"uvH seems to have been to
persons who
up on a writ of habeas corpus and discharged
bail and
into their O>Yn recognizance from
arrested for the same offense and obliged to sue
out a second writ. This appears from the provision by which
the person
may be again arrested by the order
of the
wherein he shall be bound by recognizance to
appear.
Though I think, however, it [section 6] can only
the seeond arrest is substantially the same cause
as the
so that the return to the second writ of habeas
corpus rahwd for the opinion of the court the same question
with reference to the validity of the grounds of detention as
the first.' '!'his is but another way of stating the proposition
that the
upon habeas corpus operates as a bar
as to the particular proceeding or process
and it is res adjudicata only upon the same
under the same state of facts. Thus it
has been he1d that a
upon habeas corpus for failure
of
does not bar further prosecution upon another indictment. In
ril
59 Kan. 671, it is accordingly held
that \dwrc a court discharges a petitioner because no offense
was
for which he could be prosecuted, its order not
restores him to JibPrty, but terminates pending proand he cannot be
arrested or
is instituted ~"'.u"'"'
a7 Minn. 404, it was held that a
corpus for defect of proof merely
proceeding so that the
cannot

from arrest
and determination of some material
, it cannot be held that
an estoppel against the
now
the arn•st and removal for trial of the relator . .
re
186 Cal. 29a, 2f!7
P.
.)
A similar view has been
eluding Missouri.
E:r.
r128 S.\Y.2d J082]; Um:ted
F.
951
C.C.A. 639] ; In 1·e
59 Kan. 671
P.
686]; 25 Am.Jnr., Habeas Corpus, § 157
Judgments, § 827, p. 1759 et. seq.) For
parte iii· essina, supra, the Missouri court was concerned with
a prisoner who was held pursuant to extradition proceedings by the Missouri police on warrant of the governor of
that state at the request of the governor of Kansas. The
Kansas agent appeared. 'l'he
habeas corpus
and pleaded a release on a writ obtained
years
on similar extradition proceedings where it was found that
the prisoner >vas not a
from
for he had not
been in Kansas at the time of the crime. His
>vas upheld,
no new facts appearing.
The Inajority opinion relies upon State
336 1\:Io. 682 [80 S.W.2d 195], but as seen
Ex
supra, is a later and controlling decision. I think
it is
therefore, that the Missouri court did have
diction and did decide the
Its
should be respected. No reason for
I conclude, therefore, that a
corpus
nuder the circumstances here
made either in
California or Missouri, would be res
in another proceeding in the same state.
It is the general policy o£ this state to
conclusive
effect to the judgments of sister states. "The effect of a
judicial record of a sister state is the same in tMs state as in
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the state where it u•as made, cxeept that it can only he en~
here by an CJction or sp0eial proceeding .
" (Code
Civ Proe., § 1913.) (S0e Biewend v. Biewend, 17 CaU~d
108 [109 P.2d 701, 132 A.L.R. 1264] ; Gilmer v. Spitalny, 84
Cal.App.2d 39 [189 P.2d 744].) And the writ of habeas
c:orpus is the writ of freedom and where there has been a
<lischargt• thereunder, the pri:-:;oner should not be further
hara;;sed under the same set of circumstances. The State of
California actively participated in the Missouri court proeeedings and I assume that court applied California law in
arriving at its eonclusion. There is, therefore, no reason why
the Missouri judg1nent should not be given binding effeet.
There are cases whieh have said that a discharge through
habeas corpus in another state will not be given effect in the
state where thr aeeused is charged with a crime. (See Ex
parte Silverman, 69 Ohio App. 128 [42 N.E.2d 87] ; State v.
Wall, 187 Minn. 246 [244 N.W. 811, 85 A.L.R. 114]; Letwick v. State, 211 Ark. 1 [198 S.W.2d 830] .) In the
Silverman and Letwick cases, the question of waiver of further right to punish the prisoner was not involved. The
issue in the asylum state habeas corpus proceedings was
whether under the conditions then existing the prisoner was
lawfully in custody. They did not concern a situation such
as we have here where the conditions and issues are identical.
Nor vvere the same issues presented in the \Vall case, where
the court relied on the premise that the discharge would not
be res judicata in the asylum state. As we have seen, it
would be res judicata in Missouri, the asylum state here, as
well as in California, the demanding state.
Similar comments are applicable to the general rule that
a discharge on habeas corpus from custody grounded on
extradition proceedings does not bar subsequent arrest, for
in those cases the release is bottomed on some defect in the
extradition proceedings such as the warrant or otherwise,
and naturally when those defects are corrected, the second
habeas corpus proceedings involve new issues and different
facts. Whatever may be the usual rule, I see no valid reason
for not giving conclusive effect to the Missouri judgment
here where the issues are identical, the proper law was applied, and this state was adequately represented.
It has been held in the federal courts that habeas corpus
was not available to release a prisoner held on an extradition
warrant where the grounds claimed were that he would be
given unconstitutional treatment if the prisoner were re-

fon~ed

,July 1901]

IN RE KD1LER

58:3

[37 C.2d 568; 233 P.2d 9()2]

turned to the demanding state. (United States v. McClain,
42 F.Supp. 429; Johnson v. Matthews, 182 F.2d 677.) But
the contrary has also been held. (Johnson v. Dye, 175 F.2d
250, reversed for failure to exhaust remedies in state court,
Dye v. Johnson, 338 U.S. 864 [70 S.Ct. 146, 94 L.Ed. 530];
Ree Harper v. Wall, 85 F.Supp. 78:3; Application of Middlebrooks, 88 F.Snpp. 943: Ex parte Marshall, 85 F.Supp. 771.)
The court in ,Johnson v. Matthews, supra, seemed to think it
did not havr jurisdiction but here the Missouri court took
jurisdiction and decided the identical issue now presented,
and there is no reason why we should ignore its adjudication
in view of the strong policy of this state to give "full faith
and credit'' to judgments of sister states. The Matthews casP
does not hold, as has been suggested, that a court in an
asylum state could not constitutionally have jurisdiction to
decide the issue of whether the demanding state has waived
all elaim to thi' exaction of further penal punishmfmt. While
it ma;v not be customary to settle such an issue in habeas
\'Orpns proceedings in the asylum state following the initiation of extradition proceedings, yet that question was presented here with this state participating and was decided.
The policy arguments with respect to extradition might well
have been advanced by California in the Missouri proceedings, but were not. Now we have the solemn adjudication of
Missouri-a sisti'r state-and the settled policy is to recognize
that adjudication. In the inti'rests of interstate harmony,
it should not be disregarded.
I would therefore releasi' petitioni'r from custody forthwith.

